

CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes are often denigrated as meaningless exercises in political theater. Yet the burgeoning literature on authoritarian regimes more broadly has produced a wealth of insights into particular institutions such as legislatures, courts, and elections; into regime practices such as co-optation and repression; and into non-democratic sources of accountability. In this vein, this volume explores the form and function of constitutions in countries without the fully articulated institutions of limited government. The chapters utilize a wide range of methods and focus on a broad set of cases representing many different types of authoritarian regimes. The book offers an exploration into the constitutions of authoritarian regimes, generating broader insights into the study of constitutions and their functions more generally.

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Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

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CAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITY PRESS

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

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www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107663947

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First published 2014

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes / Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago; Alberto Simpser, University of Chicago.

 $pages\ cm.-(Comparative\ constitutional\ law\ and\ policy)$

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-107-04766-2 (hardback)

Constitutional law.
 Authoritarianism.
 Ginsburg, Tom, editor of compilation.
 Simpser, Alberto, 1971– editor of compilation.

к3165.С63 2013

342-dc23 2013030082

ISBN 978-1-107-04766-2 Hardback ISBN 978-1-107-66394-7 Paperback

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