

Cambridge University Press

978-1-107-04766-2 - Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes

Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

Contents

<i>List of Contributors</i>	<i>page</i> ix
1. Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser	1
PART I. THE CATEGORY	
2. Ruling against Rules Adam Przeworski	21
3. Authoritarian Constitutionalism: Some Conceptual Issues Mark Tushnet	36
PART II. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES	
4. The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo	53
5. Authoritarian Constitution Making: The Role of the Military in Latin America Gabriel L. Negretto	83
6. Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Egyptian Constitution of 1971 Kristen Stilt	111

PART III. CONTENTS OF AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONS

7. The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions 141
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton

8. Constitutional Variation among Strains of Authoritarianism 165
David S. Law and Mila Versteeg

**PART IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AUTHORITARIAN
CONSTITUTIONS**

9. The Role of Presidential Power in Authoritarian Elections 199
Jennifer Gandhi
10. The Informal Politics of Formal Constitutions: Rethinking
the Effects of “Presidentialism” and “Parliamentarism” in
the Cases of Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Ukraine 218
Henry E. Hale
11. The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China 245
Xin He

- Index* 265