

Single Supervisory Mechanism

A Practitioner's Guide

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Klaus Lackhoff

Single Supervisory Mechanism

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DIE FACHBUCHHANDLUNG

Single Supervisory Mechanism

European Banking
Supervision by the SSM

A Practitioner's Guide

by

Klaus Lackhoff

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Pour Nadia, Samuel et Simon

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Preface

Establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and thereby denationalizing banking supervision is a substantial step of European integration and puts a lot of responsibility on the European Central Bank (ECB).

As an outsider one gets the impression that this responsibility is deeply felt by the ECB as organisation and by its staff. The ambition “to get it right” and the intent to ensure that significant European credit institutions are sufficiently capitalized in order to be in the position to survive an aggravation of the still on-going financial crisis can almost be felt. While this might also cause legal issues if ambition and legal framework do not fit together the significant point is that the ECB is well aware that the SSM is among others a decisive factor for the shape of the European financial markets. This is in particular true after the decision of the United Kingdom in favour of the “Brexit”. And if the SSM should fail the Banking Union will not proceed.

So, the SSM should better be a success. However, establishing the SSM and supervising the significant credit institutions is a Herculean task. Further, acting as an administrative agency – i. e. as a banking supervisory authority – is new ground for the ECB as an institution. And all this has to be done on the basis of a new legal framework – consisting in particular of the SSM-Regulation and the SSM-Framework Regulation.

The purpose of this book is to shed some light on the new organisational and procedural framework applying to banking supervision. It does not intend to discuss again whether the SSM makes sense or not and how it should best be structured. The articles looking at that are legion. But the SSM, as it is, is a fact and a more practical view might be of help for those who have to work with it. This book looks at the SSM from this perspective. Criticism with regard to the legal framework and/or ECB's actions within this framework is against this background based on the conviction that we all have a common interest to get this right and to make the existing SSM an effective system for banking supervision. Otherwise we all will feel the consequences of failing to do so.

The foregoing also sheds some light on the positions that will be pursued in this book. While objectivity may not be achieved, what can and needs to be followed is, however, an appropriate methodological approach. In the area of law this in particular includes to apply the different methods of interpretation. From the above it may be clear that this book puts a particular emphasis on the teleological interpretation. The SSM-Regulation and the SSM-Framework Regulation should (while respecting methodological limitations) be understood as a comprehensive system whose functioning and effectiveness was an legislative objective that, therefore, should be taken into account when discussing specific legal issues.

On this basis it is almost superfluous to spell it out but this book exclusively reflects the personal views of the author (who can be reached via lackhoff_ssm@yahoo.com) (and not necessarily those of the ECB) as of 1 December 2016 and all mistakes are only his.

Hamm

Klaus Lackhoff

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