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978-0-521-76120-8 - Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis

Simon A. B. Schropp

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

## CONTENTS

<i>List of figures</i>	<i>page</i>	xi
<i>List of abbreviations</i>		xii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>		xiv
<i>Foreword</i>		xvii
<b>1 Introduction: trade policy flexibility in the WTO – vice or virtue?</b>	<b>1</b>	
1.1 Trade policy flexibility in the WTO: a system at fault		3
1.2 Some definitional groundwork: connecting issues of breach, remedies, and commitment level in incomplete contracts		7
1.3 Objectives of the study		12
1.4 A reader's guide to this study		14
1.5 A brief survey of the literature on trade policy flexibility and enforcement in the WTO		20
<b>PART I An introduction to incomplete contracting</b>		<b>27</b>
<b>2 Complete contracts and the contracting ideal</b>	<b>29</b>	
2.1 Contracts: enforceable commitment over time		29
2.1.1 Timing		30
2.1.2 Commitment: cooperative intent and assurance		30
2.1.3 Effective enforcement and the link between commitment and enforcement		32
2.1.4 Concluding remarks on the definition of contracts		41
2.2 Basics of contracting: creating rules		43
2.2.1 Primary rules of contracting: exchange of entitlements		43
2.2.2 Secondary rules of contracting: entitlement protection		46
2.2.3 Tertiary rules of contracting: enforcement of entitlements		49
2.2.4 Mixed regimes of entitlement and entitlement protection		50

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-76120-8 - Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis

Simon A. B. Schropp

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

viii

CONTENTS

2.3	Types of contracts and alternatives to contracting	54
2.3.1	Collaboration vs. coordination	54
2.3.2	Complexity of contracts and alternatives to contracting	56
2.4	The contracting ideal: the Pareto-efficient complete contingent contract	57
<b>3</b>	<b>Incomplete contracting and the essence of flexibility</b>	<b>60</b>
3.1	A categorization of contractual incompleteness	61
3.1.1	What makes contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality	62
3.1.2	Contractual incompleteness: a taxonomy	65
3.1.3	Effects of incompleteness on contracting behavior	77
3.2	How to deal with contractual incompleteness: strategies of gap-filling	84
3.2.1	Circumnavigating incompleteness: comprehensive contracting	85
3.2.2	Seizing regret: drafting flexibility mechanisms	87
3.2.3	Minimizing room for disputes: the principle of precaution	94
3.2.4	Delegating responsibility: using courts as gap-fillers	95
3.2.5	Summary: dealing with contractual incompleteness and the significance of contractual rules of default	98
3.3	Crafting rules of flexibility: inalienability, specific performance, or liability?	101
3.3.1	Inalienability or efficient non-performance?	105
3.3.2	Liability or property rule?	107
3.3.3	Additional modalities of default rule design	122
3.4	The efficient “breach” contract as the incomplete-contracting ideal	124
3.5	A first step towards a general theory of disputes?	128
	<b>PART II Theorizing about the WTO as an incomplete contract</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Adding context: the WTO as an incomplete contract</b>	<b>133</b>
4.1	Players, preferences, and contractual intent	134
4.1.1	Players and preferences: political economy theories of endogenous trade policy-making	135
4.1.2	Contractual intent: what is the rationale for trade cooperation?	143

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-76120-8 - Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis

Simon A. B. Schropp

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

## CONTENTS

ix

4.1.3	A tentative conclusion: trade agreements based on market access externalities and minimum standards	181
4.2	Primary rules of contracting: basic entitlements in the WTO	190
4.2.1	Bilateral market access entitlement	191
4.2.2	Minimum standard entitlements	193
4.2.3	Basic auxiliary rules of entitlement	194
4.2.4	Prominent role of the market access entitlement	196
4.3	Establishing the WTO as an incomplete contract	199
4.3.1	Contingencies and uncertainty affecting the market access entitlement	202
4.3.2	Contingencies, uncertainty, and incompleteness affecting minimum standard entitlements and other multilateral entitlements	210
4.4	Conclusion: the WTO – an incomplete contract based on market access externalities and minimum standards	211
<b>5</b>	<b>Analyzing the system of non-performance in the WTO</b>	<b>213</b>
5.1	Trade policy flexibility and protection of the market access entitlement	214
5.1.1	De iure protection of the market access entitlement	215
5.1.2	De facto protection of the market access entitlement	222
5.2	De iure and de facto protection of the coordination entitlements	228
5.2.1	De iure protection of multilateral entitlements	228
5.2.2	De facto protection of multilateral entitlements	230
5.3	Rules of enforcement	230
5.4	Does the current system of trade policy flexibility and entitlement protection make sense?	234
5.4.1	Flawed protection of the market access entitlement	234
5.4.2	Flawed protection of multilateral coordination entitlements	247
5.4.3	Conclusion and consequences	249
	<b>PART III Flexibility and enforcement in the WTO: towards an agenda for reform</b>	<b>255</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Theorizing about the WTO as an efficient “breach” contract</b>	<b>257</b>
6.1	The “trade game”	260
6.2	Organizing protection of the market access entitlement	264
6.2.1	Focusing on default rules	265
6.2.2	Inalienability or <i>ex post</i> discretion?	266

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-76120-8 - Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement in the World Trade Organization: A Law and Economics Analysis

Simon A. B. Schropp

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

x

CONTENTS

6.2.3	A property or liability rule of escape? A question of transaction costs	280
6.2.4	Specifics of the default rule	286
6.2.5	Conclusion: an unconditional liability rule as optimal protection of the market access entitlement	288
6.3	Organizing the protection of multilateral entitlements	289
6.3.1	Focusing on default rules	289
6.3.2	Optimal design of default rules protecting multilateral entitlements	290
6.3.3	Conclusion: mixed default rules of protection for multilateral entitlements	295
6.4	A two-tier system of enforcement	295
6.5	The vWTO as an efficient “breach” contract: a “better” trade agreement?	300
6.5.1	How do the WTO and the vWTO differ?	301
6.5.2	Efficiency edge of the vWTO over the WTO	303
6.5.3	The vWTO: a “better” contract?	305
<b>7</b>	<b>Towards an efficient “breach” contract: an agenda for reform</b>	<b>308</b>
7.1	The shortlist of reform	308
7.1.1	Establish a revised GATT Art. XIX	309
7.1.2	Add Art. <i>Xbis</i> to the WTO Agreement	312
7.1.3	Revise DSU Art. 22	313
7.2	Long-term reform proposals	317
7.2.1	Reforming the protection of the market access entitlement	317
7.2.2	Reforming the protection of multilateral entitlements	319
7.2.3	Reforming the WTO enforcement regime	320
7.3	Final remarks and future research	320
	<i>Bibliography</i>	324
	<i>Index</i>	347